"Leadership through reciprocity and temptation"
When people or institutions donate to a public good, why do they often announce their plans beforehand? I address this question in the context of menu choice: individuals first set their menus, or restrictions on future action choices, and later choose their actions. I study an environment in which two kinds of agents, called "selfish" and "normative," choose a level of public good provision. I assume that normative agents have a preference for incorporating reciprocity, but also a temptation to be selfish, as in Gul and Pesendorfer's temptation model. I determine under what conditions there exist subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in which selfish players contribute to the public good, avoiding the tragedy of the commons. I characterize two families of strongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, and show that the best one exhibits a behavior that I call "moral leadership." Specifically, moral leaders pay the full temptation cost to motivate normative followers to partially pay the temptation cost and selfish followers to contribute partially.
Index egalitarian allocation of resources among sectors, with Biung-ghi Ju
We explore a resource allocation problem in which members of a society may have different ability to produce an output. We extend the model in Chun, Jang, and Ju (2014) so that agents have not only one but two capabilities. It is shown that an allocation rule satisfying priority and solidarity is a rule which equalizes indices of all agents, where an index consists of given amount of resources and outputs that can be produced with them.
"The Pareto principle and resource egalitarianism," Mathematical Social Sciences, January 2017, Volume 85, pp 23-29.
This paper is a response to the literature that the standard weak Pareto principle is incompatible with the bundle-reducing transfer principle. Sprumont (2012) proposes the consensual leximin ordering that satisfies i) a Paretian axiom that is weaker than the standard Pareto principle and ii) a property called Dominance Aversion that is a stronger axiom than the bundle-reducing transfer principle. I introduce and study the leximin Paretian ordering, which refines the consensual leximin ordering by adding the Pareto principle to the concept of lexicographic egalitarianism. I characterize the leximin Paretian ordering to show that this ordering satisfies stronger notions of Dominance Aversion and of the Paretian axiom used in Sprumont (2012). I also provide an alternative characterization of the consensual Rawlsian ordering. I introduce several new axioms, including the Permutation Pareto Principle and Internal Dominance, and study their logical relationships in this paper.
"Priority, solidarity and egalitarianism," with Y. Chun and B. Ju, Social Choice and Welfare, October 2014, Volume 43, Issue 3, pp 577-589.
We provide alternative axiomatic characterizations of the extended egalitarian rules (Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, 2006) in a fixed-population setting of the canonical resource allocation model based on individual capabilities (output functions). Our main axioms are disability monotonicity (no reduction in the amount of resources allocated to an agent after she becomes more disabled) and agreement (when there is a change in agents' capabilities or total resources, all agents who remain unchanged should be influenced in the same direction: all unchanged agents get more or all get less or all get the same amount as before).
Work in Progress
Public good provision: Bayesian persuasion and moral leadership
Disability monotonicity, Agreement, resource egalitarianism, and outcome egalitarianism: an experimental context, with Zhi Li
On the Loss of Efficiency from Inequality, with Junnan He